



MOBILISING MIGRANTS' SKILLS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE MENA REGION

Making the Most of Young Migrants Skills

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How can the different actors promote
the use of skills for development ¹

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**The role of different actors in the relation between human
migration and development**

¹ The opinions expressed and arguments employed here are under the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the UNFPA or of the OECD or of its member countries

1. The precise focus

1. 1. Migration – multifaceted and hard to configure

Alongside goods trading, financial movements and information flows, international human migration may be classified as the fourth component of ongoing globalisation. Of these four dimensions, it is the one whose features are the *most complex*, as it relates primarily to an amalgam of *social practices* involving individual behaviour patterns that are largely impervious to public policies or the activity of dominant private interests. When people leave or return to their home country, secure access to a host country, or transfer funds, rights or skills, the decisions entailed are not readily amenable to control, guidance or constraint.

This prevalence of endlessly varied *individual practices* results in a vast medley of phenomena inherently hard to configure. And when the field of migration is viewed in relation to development, understanding and schematising what happens become harder still.

Like other behaviour by migrants, the different forms of support they can contribute to the development of their home country has to do with *social practices* that pre-exist *independently* of public policies. These policies may or may not encourage support, but their development and implementation remain sensitive and complex, given the enormous diversity of migrant populations and their behaviour.

1. 2. Gradual changes in migration and how it is viewed

For several years, a series of trends has gradually altered the basic facts and perception of migration from the standpoint of its host and home countries. The decreasing costs of moving people and information, the increase in average skill levels associated with migrant flows, the growing presence of women migrants, the need for host countries to enhance their own appeal for qualified migrants, increasingly strong diasporas, growing recognition of the fact that migrants can contribute to the development of their country of origin, and the emergence of economic powers on the world stage that are still generating large groups of migrants, have all transformed both their objective and subjective position in home and host societies – and indeed worldwide. Their *double absence* ('twofold absence')² has become a 'twofold presence'³.

Migrants are both *daily actors and witnesses* in the process of globalisation. Their horizons include their own host and home countries, but also the other host countries of family members. Village residents from the Morocco Atlas region, the Senegal river region, or the

² The expression coined by Abdel Malek Sayad who used it in the title of a book: *La double absence. Des illusions aux souffrances de l'immigré*, preface by Pierre Bourdieu, Paris, Seuil, 1999.

³ Jean-Baptiste Mayer, speaking at the 'Focus on Development' conference organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris on 22 February 2013.

Mekong Delta in Vietnam, who have emigrated to France, will have relatives and friends in Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Canada, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and elsewhere. As migrants, they are very much 'in touch' and their horizons are truly transnational.

Nevertheless, the economic and social crisis experienced by European countries is taking its toll on migrants, especially where they have immigrated recently and the crisis is really severe, as in Italy and above all Spain. Massive redundancies, growing insecurity, helplessness on the part of the public authorities, fewer social safety nets, and political manipulation are all undermining social cohesion in the host societies and aggravating the *tensions caused by identity issues*, which are deeply affecting societies in the North.

In the South, the considerable tensions across the whole gamut of labour market qualifications is continuing to fuel the departure of young people at the risk of their lives, which is further hastened by the popular uprisings affecting Arabic countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean. Neither have migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa dwindled, on the contrary boosting transit migration in the countries of North Africa – migration which is tending to become permanent as European borders are ever more firmly blocked. *Identity issues* are also a manifold source of tension in the southern Mediterranean region.

1. 3. Migration – a problem or a mirror?

Migration is the focus of intense activity in the *psyche* of all countries concerned, whether they are starting points, destinations or transit locations, which means virtually all countries in the world. Migration is nearly always approached as a *problem*, a thorny issue to which societies have no answer. What is the real significance of departing migrants and how can one offset the loss they represent to their home countries? What are the consequences of the arrival of young migrants in ageing societies and how is this influx to be controlled?

A confrontation with the Other, migration raises the question of *identity* and produces a *mirror effect*. It measures individual societies with respect to their capabilities and their own vitality: in a home country society, this means its development capacity and ability to keep its young people from emigrating, whereas in the case of host societies, it refers to ability to face the future confidently and display openness. In developed societies beset by a *profound identity crisis* with the challenge to their global hegemony, public policies thus lack conviction and/or are victims of concerns extending far beyond the issue of migration.

This reference to deep concerns affecting social mindsets explains why migration is often *exploited* for political ends in situations of *growing cultural isolationism*, both in the North and in many countries in the South. Migration is thus greatly oversimplified in formal statements about the phenomena involved, and often in the resultant public policies.

1. 4. Development and Migration: our working assumptions

The approach set out here is drawn, on the one hand, from my twofold experience as a contributor to development within an NGO concerned with migrants, namely “Migrations & Développement” (M&D)⁴, and as an active member of a platform of migrant-based NGOs, the “Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations” (FORIM, or the Forum of Migration-based Organisations for International Solidarity)⁵ and, on the other, from my research as a development economist within the Ministry of the Economy in France. This approach rests on the following assumptions:

a/ Development is basically a domestic concern⁶: each society sets its priorities and works out its own means of development (or of non-development), even if this means looking elsewhere for reliably tested solutions. But to be truly part of a development process, such an approach involving imported external solutions must itself be home-based.

b/ Development – and not migration – as the starting point. It is by adopting the *dynamics of the development of societies* in all their dimensions as the starting point, in both the North and the South, that one can *understand migration* and its possible contribution to development. In other words, migration cannot be regarded as a premise in the approach to development, but as a possible *catalyst* for development.

1. 5. Migrants as a catalyst for development

Migrants cannot initiate the development of their home country

Academic studies of all countries show that, in macroeconomic terms, migrants alone cannot themselves trigger the emergence of their native societies. Here, *internal factors* are key. While migrants are incapable of initiating take-off at national level, they can ‘rally to the cause’ by subsequently supporting its momentum. It is the vitality of development in China and India which makes these countries attractive for their native investors, researchers or emigrant entrepreneurs.

⁴ M&D : <http://www.migdev.org/>

⁵ FORIM: <http://cluster011.ovh.net/~forim/>

⁶ I disagree with the approach which considers that underdevelopment derives from a set of ‘shortcomings’ or ‘lack’ factors. The history of development theories devised in the North and practised throughout the South for the last 60 years is littered with reference to such factors supposedly afflicting countries in the South – factors assessed with respect to the implied norm represented by the developed countries: thus after the lack of savings in the 1960s and 1970s came the lack of macroeconomic balance in the 1980s, the lack of openness and of free markets in the 1990s, and of ‘good governance’, capacity, and rights from 2000-2010 (to be followed by whatever comes next). It is by considering these ‘lacks’ that development policies have been devised in the North and applied and supported with thousands of billions of dollars, yet to little effect as we now know. The history of the last 60 years, and especially the spectacularly successful take-offs achieved in East Asia, clearly demonstrates that the emergence of these societies has been attributable not to a response to shortcomings, but to the home-grown development of a shared and implemented strategic vision.

Generally speaking and where the country lacks impetus for all-round development, action by its native migrants within it is likely to be more effective when *concentrated* on a particular region.

It is primarily at regional level that migrants can contribute to development⁷

It is within their *home region* that migrants may have a really important role to play, as here all those actively concerned can interrelate closely, and develop personal relations based on trust. In this way, therefore, migrants may 'mesh' with action for development through their contribution to *learning processes*: they become more intensively involved within a circumscribed territory than within their country as a whole.

As members of societies in the South, migrants can *take part* in domestically devised development, and their action may assume some significance in terms of momentum and its role as a catalyst within a given locality. They are familiar with their home society and, because they belong to it, can *legitimately* hand down knowledge acquired in the North, by interpreting and readapting it in line with home country norms to help strengthen learning mechanisms in a wide variety of contexts.

This knowledge transfer approach amounts to a much-needed broader way of considering the links between migration and home country development, which have hitherto been viewed as no more than fund transfers.

Migrants indeed '*do not transfer just money*⁸. They are also conveyors, in an integral package, of *ways of life, norms and values, and skills*, and extend their *networks* against an international backdrop. They relay fresh approaches to education (especially in the case of girls), health and human reproduction (by promoting conduct and attitudes conducive to smaller families, which they have accepted in the host country). They may be 'active conveyors' of practices acquired through their relations with administrative authorities in that country, in local governance when they assume responsibilities in village associations, or in elective office or other commitments.

⁷ In the case of Morocco, it is nonetheless worth noting that action by migrants had a significant impact *at national level* on public policies, by shifting central government activity towards rural communities, previously regarded as 'unproductive' Morocco. Thus the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) launched in 2005 relied largely on the village associations which were established essentially thanks to the energy of migrants. The action of the public provider, the Office National d'Electricité (ONE), in supplying electricity to the countryside owes much to the thousands of separate electrification operations performed by migrants throughout the whole of Morocco.

In Morocco, as in many countries in the South, political organisations, including the trade unions, were of only minor significance in relations between central government and civil society. When the Moroccan government slackened its control over associations at the end of the 1980s, their activity became increasingly significant as they filled the gap left by other organisations. Migrants were to the forefront of this trend, as their migrant status gave them relative protection from the pressures of local authorities which for a long time obstructed implementation of the law authorising the establishment of associations. The 'battle' of local associations, which had been won at national level, was fought in earnest *locally* in the many different area subdivisions in which migrants were active. The creation of grass-roots associations then spread to the regions in which migrants were few in number.

⁸To borrow the relevant catchphrase of an international money transfer company.

These underlying subtle, uncertain and highly varied processes, whether organised or implicit, do not readily lend themselves to guidance by public policies⁹.

1.6. Actors in the 'migration – development' domain

In this context, we examine the role of the various actors involved in the relation between migration and development. We shall focus primarily on migration from the rural community in Morocco – the country's main source of migration - to France, and wherever possible throw light on migration at a broader level.

All those active in the area of migration and development make up a broad spectrum across the North as well as the South.

- **In the North, in host countries**, there are first of all *migrants* as individuals, each of them acting as a private agent, in a relationship with their native country which depends among other factors on the quality of their integration in the host country. Next come *associations of migrants*, which expanded increasingly in France from 1981 onwards¹⁰. Such associations may have legal or *de facto* status, be national or issue-oriented, and *form federations* based on nationality or particular concerns. Also encountered are *platforms* bringing together these associations (or federations of associations) of migrants. Then there are *local authorities* that pursue relations at varied levels of interaction with the communities of migrants present in their area of jurisdiction. The *international solidarity NGOs*, for their part, work primarily for the defence of migrants' rights. *Workers' trade unions* may also be involved in this interaction between migration and development. Finally, *states* responsible for public policies may (or may not) link their support for the development initiatives of migrants in their native country to the control of migration flows.

- In the South, in the home countries, most *states* are in the early stages of devising public policies concerned with their citizens abroad – the diasporas – and in some countries are doing so at the instigation of Europe. *Local authorities* are potentially active, especially in initiating the recognition of emigrants originally from their area as fully committed local players in their native region. *Village organisations* have become very closely involved with the migrants who were often instrumental in setting them up. Finally, the *migrants themselves* comprise those acting primarily on behalf of their family, for themselves (as a rule in property investment), or for their village, occasionally on behalf of their commune.

2. Role of these various actors in stimulating the relationship between migration and development

⁹ See also Jacques Ould Aoudia: *Migrations et développement: fantasmes et réalités d'une pratique sociale universelle*, in 'Le Maghreb dans les relations internationales', Khadija Mohsen-Finan (Ed.), IFRI - CNRS Ed., Paris, 2011.

¹⁰ In October 1981, French law extended to foreigners the right to set up and run associations. Previously, foreigners could only be members of them.

2.1. In the North, a *gradually emerging chain of actors*

- **Migrants are the first link in this chain.** Their attachment to their native country persists ('once a migrant, always a migrant'), even if it materialises in many different and changing ways throughout their lives, depending on whether they are training, employed, unemployed or retired. Generations of migrants, who often have dual nationality, experience different relations from those of their parents: their sense of belonging to their native country is stronger than their attachment to the family village. Here again, the bond assumes various forms depending on the personal career of these second- or third-generation (or subsequent) migrants. As regards Senegalese migrants in three European cities (Milan, Geneva and Paris), a study has found that the strength of *active solidarity* with the home country is directly linked to the *integration* of migrants in their host environment¹¹. My observation of these trends in the case of Moroccan migrants bears out this finding.

- **Associations of migrants.** A particular group of migrants among those best integrated in the host country are ready to act within *de facto* associations (for *ad hoc* initiatives, such as dispatching an ambulance to the home village) or associations with legal status¹², where long-term initiatives are concerned. When migration is concentrated along a particular route, as in the case of the migrant community from Figuig¹³ in eastern Morocco, which has extensively settled in the Seine St Denis *département*, it can secure the support of the local authority (in this case, the *Conseil général*). This is providing a nucleus of support for the entire Figuig diaspora in Europe.

These associations are starting to diversify. Based at the outset on the home local community (the village), they are now expanding to include transverse groupings linked to activity in the host country. Among them are associations of doctors such as the "Association Médicale d'Aide au Développement entre l'Auvergne et le Maroc" (AMDAM, or the "Auvergne- Morocco Medical Association for Development Support")¹⁴, student associations such as the "Association des Marocains des Grandes Écoles" (AMGE, or the "Association of Moroccans from *Grandes Écoles*")¹⁵, young executives in French firms promoting the establishment of enterprises in Morocco ("Maroc Entrepreneurs")¹⁶, an association of

¹¹ *Migration transnationale sénégalaise, intégration et développement*, coordinated by Sandro Cattacin, University of Geneva (UNIGE) - Sociology department, with the assistance of the Research Centre Methodology, Inequalities and Social Change at the University of Lausanne, the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI) in Rome, the UNESCO International Migration and Multiculturalism Section (abolished) in Paris, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Paris: and with the participation of the Geneva Senegalese Association, the Association Sunugal in Milan, and the Association Tamba Initiatives in Paris.

¹² Here, the Organisations de Solidarité Internationale issues des Migrations (OSIMs, or Migration-based Organisations for International Solidarity).

¹³ Figuig Federation of Associations: <http://www.faf-mf.org/>

¹⁴ AMDAM: <http://www.amdamfr.com/>

¹⁵ AMGE: <http://www.amge-caravane.com/>

¹⁶ Maroc Entrepreneurs: <http://www.marocentrepreneurs.com/>

elected representatives of Moroccan origin in France, which is now being formed, and many other bodies¹⁷. Each of these types of association is forging links with its close environment and its counterparts in French civil society recruited from students, young entrepreneurs, locally elected representatives and others.

As regards all migration to France, the OSIMs pursue a variety of aims¹⁸. Many of them which are nationally oriented seek to *represent their community* in the host country. In this way they attempt to become the main contact point for their home country authorities in the host country embassy and indeed sometimes for the political authorities in the home country itself. This applies to most OSIMs with migrants of sub-Saharan origin, such as Malians in the case of the “Haut Conseil des Maliens de France” (“High-level Council of Malians in France”)¹⁹. This readily justifiable goal of achieving representation takes clear precedence over action geared to development of the home country.

A number of OSIMs are formed in accordance with *transnational criteria* such as *gender* and comprise women migrants or the daughters of migrants across sub-Saharan Africa. An example is the “Fédération des Initiatives des Femmes Africaines de France et d'Europe” (IFAFE, or “Federation of Initiatives on the part of African Women in France and Europe”)²⁰. These organisations take action to defend the rights of women migrants and to further development in their native countries.

For other OSIMs, *home country development* is the prime concern, as in the case of most associations of migrants from East Asia, but also the association “Migrations & Développement” (M&D). This body does not seek to represent the Moroccan community in France, and is focused very clearly both on the development of the home country and on achieving integration in the host country²¹.

¹⁷ Given the number of migrant associations formed by Moroccan migrants in France, this description cannot claim to cover them all. For a more detailed account, see Zakya Daoud, *La diaspora marocaine en Europe*, Editions Séguier, Paris, 2010.

¹⁸ No reference is made here to refugee organisations with mainly *political* aims relating to the home country.

¹⁹ <http://www.voidargent.fr/content/haut-conseil-des-maliens-de-france>.

²⁰ IFAFE: <http://cluster011.ovh.net/~forim/?q=user/112>

²¹ Aims of the association M&D (Article 2 of its statutes): *The purpose of the association is to perform tasks of a general nature that are mainly philanthropic, social and educational, and to bring together within or outside France any person or legal entity interested in organising or taking part in development initiatives in the areas from which immigration originally occurred. Initiatives should among other things be capable of supporting persons in need, conducting training and social integration activities, stemming the tide of immigration, and enhancing the power of immigration as a force for development on both sides of the Mediterranean. The association is also involved in the defence of the natural environment, and efforts to overcome pollution and other environmental hazards, and additionally supports the development of renewable energy sources. To achieve its goals, it may rely on all appropriate legal means, including training and trade, the publication of studies, humanitarian missions, education for development, and the implementation of a participatory approach based on individual or joint action in France. The association may directly carry out general interest initiatives in the field or delegate their supervision to member associations or contracted associations. It seeks to unite associations interested in its aims and working methods, whether in France or abroad.*

Organisations of the first kind are *political*, and their members are generally rallied in accordance with internal management strategies as the means of achieving representativeness vis-à-vis the authorities of the home country. Their political nature excludes them most of the time from support programmes likely to be run by the host country public authorities.

The other OSIMs pursue aims that may be supported by those authorities. M&D is one such OSIM. It seeks to adopt an operational approach in which *voluntary grass-roots activism* and *professional practice* go hand in hand, and can thus raise resources from national and international sponsors. As an association with French law legal status under a headquarters agreement with Morocco²², M&D has since its inception been noteworthy for being an OSIM *open* to non-migrants, or to migrants from other countries. As a result, volunteers contribute their own skills, and help to build bridges between M&D and French society. This characteristic, which is consistent with its commitment to development, is highly distinctive because it is clearly of a *non-community* nature. It enhances its credibility in the North and South alike and increases its potential for action.

- **Some migrant associations form federations of associations**, which in most cases are nationally oriented. Non-existent in the case of Moroccan migration for which most associations present in France operate in informal networks²³, these federated associations mainly embrace associations of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

- **Finally, some OSIM federations come together in platforms** forming associations of migrants from several backgrounds, as has occurred in France with the FORIM²⁴ set up on

²² Under the headquarters agreement with the Moroccan authorities, M&D is entitled to issue official communications in Moroccan territory, even though its governance bodies (board of directors, etc.) and auditing activity (a single account subject to official auditing) are based in France.

²³ However, attention should be drawn to the recent establishment at European level of the "Plateforme Euro-marocaine migration, développement, citoyenneté et démocratie" ("Euro-Moroccan Migration, Development, Citizenship and Democracy Platform") supported by the Conseil de la Communauté Marocaine à l'Étranger (CCME, or the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad). The Platform comprises associations of Moroccans from the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Spain.

²⁴ The following passage is taken from the FORIM website: *The Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale issues des Migrations (FORIM) is a national platform uniting networks, federations and groupings of Migration-based Organisations for International Solidarity (OSIMs), engaged in integration initiatives here and in development activities in home countries. The FORIM represents around 700 associations active in sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghrib, South East Asia, the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean region. Established in March 2002 with the support of the French public authorities, it reflects the determination of its members to involve themselves in all sectors of French civil society, for the purpose of:*

- *encouraging the integration of populations formed in international migration;*
- *intensifying relations between France and the home countries,*
- *contributing to the development of their home region.*

The FORIM projects a specific image of voluntary activity among immigrant peoples, and highlights the positive aspects of dual commitment by undertaking to promote actions in France concerned with integration, cultural exchange and development initiatives focused on the home countries.

the basis of a public initiative in 2002. This body now unites all generations of migrants and descendants of migrants from over 50 countries, with strikingly different kinds of experience, organisational traditions, integration paths, educational levels, lifetime migration periods, and relations with France. FORIM membership mainly reflects the longstanding migration to France from countries in the Maghrib, sub-Saharan Africa, former Indochina and Haiti. Migration from South Asia, English-speaking Africa and Latin America is not represented.

The FORIM has undertaken to develop regional branches in France, known as COSIMs. At the time of writing, several COSIMs are operating or about to do so, such as those in Rhône-Alpes, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Aquitaine, Normandie, PACA and Languedoc Roussillon. With the central government, the COSIMs jointly manage a fund for the grass-roots OSIMs, the PRA/OSIM²⁵, which contributes to the organisation of migrant associations working for development.

The FORIM is itself present in numerous organisations and platforms such as EDUCASOL²⁶, the European Network on Migrations and Development (EUNOMAD)²⁷ and Coordination Sud²⁸.

The FORIM is striving to accommodate new patterns of migration, and particularly the most recent flows to France from countries that are not former colonies. This organisation is being established slowly and gradually. Its governance is inherently complex. In existence now for ten years, it is still a young fragile body undergoing consolidation.

- At *European level*, an organisation such as EUNOMAD consists of around 40 NGOs from nine countries in Europe. These NGOs are pursuing a variety of goals – in organising support for migrants, and as migrant associations or research centres – based on a political vision, namely the recognition of migrants as active partners in development in both host and home countries, and the defence of migrant rights. This network aims to build on and share the experience of its members and sensitise society to migration issues and concerns.

- **All in all**, migrant associations and associations of solidarity with migrants form a *dense group of intertwined organisations*. These bodies may or may not be united in federations and platforms, with a specifically national, multinational or subject orientation, and coordinated to a greater or lesser degree at host country or European level. As collective entities, they focus to a variable extent on *representation, advocacy* (on behalf of political demands, or the defence of migrant rights), or on *development* in the home country. These organisations tend to maintain quite close links with home country sister organisations.

²⁵ PRA/OSIM: <http://www.forim.net/contenu/praosim>

²⁶ EDUCASOL: <http://www.educasol.org/>

²⁷ EUNOMAD: <http://www.eunomad.org/>

²⁸ Coordination Sud: <http://www.coordinationsud.org/>

The various international initiatives including day-long civil society events organised around each successive Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), the World Social Forum, and the Forum Social Migration et Développement (Social Migration and Development Forum) are opportunities for the platforms to broaden their approaches worldwide.

It should be noted that these platforms, which are second- or third-level organisations, have all been established *with the support of the public authorities*, usually at the national level of the host country (as in the case of the FORIM), or at European or home country level (in the case of EUNOMAD and the Plateforme Euro-marocaine migration, développement, citoyenneté et démocratie). This support from the public authorities is liable to cause *tension* whenever the advocacy pursued by some of these organisations risks compromising the public funding on which their operations greatly depend.

This *extreme diversity* of organisations and the interconnections they establish faithfully reflects the wide variety of practices typifying migration in its relation to the development of the home country, which was mentioned at the start of this text.

- **Local authorities:** Long committed to actions for development cooperation with local authorities in the South, they have recently established relations with the migrant communities present on their own territory and are increasingly becoming actors in the 'chain' linking migration to development, by practising 'CD²' or Decentralised Cooperation for Joint Development²⁹.

One example worth citing is the cooperation between the Seine-St-Denis *département* and the Federation of associations of migrants from the Figuig oasis in Morocco. Seine St Denis is home to the largest concentration of migrants from this region hemmed in by closure of the border between Morocco and Algeria. Other noteworthy examples include cooperation between the Kayes region and the town of Montreuil in the Paris area, which contains a large community of Malians from this region in South-West Mali, and cooperation between the city of Marseille and the Comoran associations present in the region³⁰.

The difficulties faced by these decentralised policies stem from the fact that public authorities in the South have little independence and very limited financial means. Furthermore, migration originates largely in rural areas in which local authorities in both the South and the North lack the size to engage in significant international cooperation. In 2011, M&D for its part initiated cooperation between the Taliouine urban community (in Taroudannt province) and the Ecrins Commune Community (in the Hautes-Alpes

²⁹ The FORIM text for the 'Focus on Development' conference stated: 'An innovative approach: CD² projects which combine Joint Development provided by the OSIMs and the Decentralised Cooperation of the local authorities', December 2012.

³⁰ For information on the Mediterranean region, see also: Jean-Louis Guigou and Michel David: *La coopération décentralisée en Méditerranée*, IPAMED, December 2012. <http://www.ipemed.coop/fr/publications-r17/rapports-syntheses-c108/la-cooperation-decentralisee-en-mediterranee-a1765.html>

département). Besides the physical similarities of these two fairly mountainous areas, this cooperation derives from relations dating back 35 years between residents of the Argentière valley and migrants from the Taliouine region who came to work in its metallurgical aluminium processing factories.

- **Trade unions:** Before considering central government as a ‘final arbiter’ in this chain, mention should be made of the workers’ trade unions which may play a part in the current situation, deeply affected in France in particular by the proliferation of *redundancies* in big industrial or service units. These lay-offs are often underpinned and supported by social planning strategies. Many of the employees concerned are migrants who maintained contacts in their native country. Some of them are and will be discharged with *financial compensation* (which may amount to several years’ salary) in addition to *training* they have obtained in their jobs. For several of them, one solution is to take the plunge by establishing an economic concern in the home country. In so doing, they turn the setback of redundancy into an opportunity to launch an investment project in their native country on a voluntary basis.

Those contemplating such action are only likely to proceed if it doesn’t mean surrendering their right to live in the host country (assuming they don’t already have dual nationality)³¹, so that when (as migrants) they go back to their home country they have a margin of error (or ‘right to fall short’) in completing their resettlement plans, with at least an entitlement to two-way free movement between host and home countries.

A proposal of this kind may mobilise OSIMs established in home countries, which are capable of providing field support to migrants intending to start a business in them.

Over and above major social plans, a recent ILO study³² shows that the employability of migrants returning to their home country is considerably enhanced if the skills acquired in their host country have been *formally recognised*, and especially those acquired during their professional activity.

- This paper has not tried to map out comprehensively and in detail all non-state entities involved in migration, but to provide a general picture and show how they form a ‘*chain*’ of *actors* who are to some extent interlinked and work in the field of migration and development in many different ways.

It is the *grass-roots OSIMs* operating mainly on a voluntary basis without public support, which arrange *financial transfers* on behalf of migrants for local development projects in

³¹ The failure of various policies offering incentives for permanent resettlement has been well documented by Hein de Haas: *Engaging Diasporas. How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries*, June 2006 - IMI - University of Oxford - Oxfam Novib.

³² *Making migration a development factor. The case of North and West Africa*. International Labour Organization, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 2010.

their home country. This is the level at which the PRA/OSIM fund is active. The common feature of other second- and third-level organisations is that they are professionalised and supported to varying degrees by national or European public funding, and tend to concentrate on advocacy.

For this reason, the 'chain of actors' as such is highly dependent on the funding and thrust of public policies.

• **The state in search of appropriate public policies reasonably separate from manipulative activity attributable to migration**³³

Faced with this profusion of organisations, practices, groupings, action levels and policy stances, central government has been hard put to devise an overall strategy to support migrants in their development initiatives.

In 2007 and 2008, the attempt to establish financial mechanisms in France to support investment in the home countries of migrants came to nothing: the *Compte Epargne Codéveloppement* (CEC, or joint development savings account), the *Livret d'Epargne Codéveloppement* (LEC, the joint development savings passbook), and the tax relief for CEC holders were ended in 2011³⁴. The complexity of these schemes, along with their lack of popularity, failure to mobilise the French banking sector, and their incompatibility with migrant saving and investment behaviour patterns led to their demise.

The formulation of a migrant support policy geared to development may be based on three main principles: 1/ *recognition* of the role of migrants ; 2/ *support* for their development initiatives; 3/ *consultation* with migrants in devising development support policies.

- **Recognition of the role of migrants** has to do with the stance of the public authorities as regards migration in general, which may be illustratively summed up in these two alternatives: will the authorities exploit the issue of migration in public debate by exacerbating the opinions of the various sectors of society, or will they instead seek to calm the tensions caused by identity issues to consolidate social cohesion? Where 'migration and development' are concerned, this choice amounts to whether or not support for development is an integral aspect of controlling migration flows. Any such connection is strongly opposed by NGOs working in advocacy on behalf of migrant rights, and by migrant OSIMs themselves. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these provisions tying development aid to migrant flow management has still to be firmly demonstrated.

From this angle, the policy intentions of the government formed after the 2012 elections in France, which stated clearly that development support would be disconnected from

³³ The present document will not consider the foreign policy dimension of host (and home) countries, which may exploit immigration (and the diaspora) for diplomatic purposes.

³⁴ Their withdrawal was justified as follows: 'both these regulated savings schemes ... are quite clearly inappropriate (...): the *Compte Epargne Codéveloppement* has still scarcely been taken up, despite its four years of existence, while merchandising of the *Livret d'Epargne Codéveloppement* has not even started in three years': <http://www.cbanque.com/placement/codeveloppement.php>

migration flow management policies, seem likely to strengthen confidence among migrants. Yet European policy, encouraged by a majority of Member States, remains strongly affected by *a security-driven approach* which covers the whole of migration policy, and may well run partially counter to public support for migrant initiatives geared to development³⁵.

- **Support for migrant initiatives** may take many different forms. With regard to the grass-roots OSIMs, establishment of the PRA/OSIM fund has represented a major breakthrough. As a mechanism for support, joint funding and capitalisation of local development proposals submitted by these core OSIMs, it is an inspiring venture for all FORIM activities and conducive to closer links among the OSIMs themselves. It includes a major training dimension for the latter which involves their mentoring by 'support operators', namely formerly established OSIMs with recognised experience.

Besides this mechanism, support for migrant initiatives calls for relations with migrants and their associations, which are based on *trust* and *long-term visions*. This presupposes that funding agencies clarify the position regarding the *precise practical approach* that migrants can apply in their development initiatives. Will this approach be formally recognised and turned to good account? Furthermore, *in terms of its forms*, such support implies the need for monitoring arrangements in which all due emphasis is attached to interpersonal relations, alongside formal supervisory mechanisms.

Indeed, migrants have retained with variable degrees of intensity the features of societies in the South: social relations remain broadly interpersonal. Trust is not established solely on the basis of formal administrative arrangements but, more than in the case of national players, calls for investment in personal relations. On the part of funding agencies, therefore, the monitoring of initiatives requires flexibility, skill and an ability to appreciate a very wide variety of situations and their underlying trends. This requirement cannot be satisfied by means of *mechanical impersonal monitoring* with the help of formal devices³⁶ which are guiding development aid schemes to an ever greater extent³⁷. Thus public policies in the North would offer far greater encouragement to development support initiatives run by migrants if stringent observation of the tools for accountability (narrative and financial reports, audits, etc.) were combined with interpersonal project monitoring by the funding agencies.

³⁵ It is not the purpose of this paper to examine European policy in the area of 'migration and development'.

³⁶ For example, a contract with the European Commission contains *eight pages* devoted to monitoring and accountability procedures and, in an annexe, just *half a page* describing the content of the action!

³⁷ This applies to all development aid mechanisms involving NGOs, and not just those concerned with migrants. Typical here is an 'illusion of control' over how financial support is used: bloated formal procedures in no way improve the accountability of development projects. But the officials responsible for monitoring aid are *exempt from all responsibility* because the formal requirements are usually satisfied, with little bearing on what happens in the field. The growing prevalence of the 'logical framework' in the submission of development projects and reports on them when complete, stems from this mechanisation of aid arrangements, which stifles the thought needed in development, by increasing the distance between what really happens, and its formal representation. This contributes powerfully to the foregoing 'illusion of control', which strips development aid of its legitimacy in North and South alike.

- **Consultation with migrants** in devising public policies. This implies support for inclusion of the migration aspect in all policies concerned with countries in the South, in terms of *consistency* (with visa and trade policies, etc.) and of *complementarity* (by examining development initiatives with migrants and their associations, especially in regions of extensive emigration). The introduction of incentives for local authorities in the host country to engage in decentralised cooperation *in partnership* with the migrant communities present in their territory may also be considered.

The establishment of a *framework for concerted action* by many players, in which migrants would be fully involved alongside all others active in development (including government, NGOs and local authorities) would be a means of achieving more generally this consultation in an open setting.

All in all, the extent to which second- and third-level organisations have depended strongly on public forms of support has been made clear. A public authority stance supportive from the symbolic angle, and in terms of its human and financial resources commitment, would have medium-term positive consequences in encouraging the participation of migrants in development initiatives undertaken by their home country.

2.2. In the South, policies are hard to formulate given changing patterns of emigration

The relations between the home societies of migrants and their diaspora are broadly ambivalent with their mixture of ostentation, envy, guilt, resentment, credit and debt, solidarity, reciprocity and so forth. And the complexity of everything to do with migration is also clear from the home country angle. Equally important is that the diaspora naturally changes over time: the children of migrants do not have the same relations with the native country of their parents as did those parents. The relation with the home village gradually fades and successive generations experience instead a sense of belonging to the country as a whole. Furthermore, during the lifetime of migrants this sense of home country kinship too may fade, when all energy is devoted to integrating in the host country ... but then reawaken once integration has been achieved.

Public policies in the South are a part of this complexity on top of which come the key issues of security, or even political control of emigration.

- From the standpoint of the Moroccan authorities, emigration has long involved overcoming two problems in one go. The first has been to lessen demographic and social pressure on the towns, which could not accommodate the rural-urban migration hastened by ongoing agricultural policy, with its goal of developing in rich irrigable plains an extensive Californian-type agriculture with few job opportunities. The second problem has been that of attracting a substantial flow of strong currencies to a country with few exportable natural resources. For this purpose, the Moroccan government was the first in the world, from the 1960s onwards, to establish public bank agencies (of the *Banque Populaire du Maroc*) in

areas in which its diaspora was concentrated, in order to attract money deposited by emigrants³⁸.

- This model, which involved regarding emigrants – who were thought of as distancing themselves temporarily from their home country – mainly as suppliers of strong currency, has had its day. With the closure of European country borders in the mid-1970s, migration gained a permanent foothold in the North. It has diversified in terms of geographical origin and skill levels, and women are more strongly represented. With their increased level of education, emigrants seek to stay in touch with their home country authorities, but fear exploitation³⁹. From the point of view of those authorities, the situation of migrants has radically changed. From a position of exclusion, because of its absence from home soil, the ‘diaspora’ is becoming an *extension* of the national community⁴⁰.

States are searching for new public policies that take account of these novel factors and are seeking henceforth to mobilise their expatriate communities on behalf of national development. The high profile in international conferences since 2000 of migration in relation to development has also obliged the authorities of countries in the South to devise public policies⁴¹. Europe, for its part, has strongly urged countries to the south of the Mediterranean and in West Africa to develop institutions and mechanisms to stem emigration flows but also transit migrant numbers.

Just as in the case of their host country authorities, migrants need to build relations based on *trust* with the authorities of their home country in line with a clear *long-term vision*. From this angle, the mechanisms established for them need to be fully consistent.

Moroccans Resident Abroad (MRE) have for some years been the focus of undivided attention. The authorities have set up a “Conseil de la Communauté Marocaine à l’Etranger” (CCME, or Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad)⁴² and established a Ministry of the Moroccan Community Resident Abroad (MCMRE)⁴³ attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I can testify to the existence of a public policy implemented by the MCMRE on an experimental basis in France⁴⁴, and entrusted to M&D as operator in the big region of south-

³⁸ Natasha Iskander: *Creative State: Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and Mexico*, Ithaca, United States, 2010.

³⁹ Jean-Baptiste Meyer, *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Bamadi Sanokho: *Politiques publiques ‘Migrations et Développement’ du Mali, du Maroc et du Sénégal: Mise à l’agenda du rôle des diasporas et jeux d’acteurs*, University Panthéon Sorbonne (Paris I), UFR Sciences Politiques. Master 2 Professionnel: Coopération Internationale, Action Humanitaire et Politiques de Développement, 2012.

⁴¹ Bamadi Sanokho, *ibid.*

⁴² CCME: <http://www.ccme.org.ma/fr/>

⁴³ MCMRE: <http://www.bladi.net/ministere-de-la-communaute-marocaine-resident-a-l-etranger.html>

⁴⁴ To our knowledge, this is one of the first public policies of a ‘developing’ country targeted at a ‘developed’ one.

east France⁴⁵. Its aim is the capacity-building of the Moroccan migrant associations working in France in the social and cultural fields and in solidarity with Morocco. The Moroccan authorities have called this programme *Enracinement sans Déracinement* ('settlement without uprooting'). This name reflects a *considerable change* in the approach of the authorities towards the diaspora. They have accepted that the children of migrants would remain *loyal* to their citizenship acquired in France, and that it was in the interests of Morocco for them to *integrate* in the host societies of their parents. The key concern for the Moroccan authorities is thus that these young people should *also remain committed* to their home country.

The establishment of *skills networks* in the diaspora⁴⁶ and the search for means of encouraging migrants to *invest* in the home country are among the main concerns of public policies now being devised and implemented by home country governments.

- **As regards investment, commitment** to the home country (or region), which stems from considerations impossible to schematise, is one of the major factors accounting for the investments undertaken by Moroccan migrants of rural origin. This is among the conclusions of the study carried out on Taroudannt Province⁴⁷, identifying factors behind the economic involvement of migrants in their home region.

It is possible to specify the thrust of a public policy for home countries to be applied *without discrimination*, so that migrants are not offered legal tax, customs or other privileges unavailable to country nationals, which would antagonise them. This public policy focus would involve making *the constituent territories of the country more attractive* for all concerned, first for its residents (to stem urban immigration in the case of rural territories), and then for migrants from both within and outside it.

Indeed, whether investing in the urban or rural environment, migrants generally undertake a *small or medium-sized* investment. For this purpose, *the territory is the appropriate level* of consideration, decision-making and action for investors, as well as for their economic and institutional partners. As a rule, they carry out their plans *in their home region* (or that of their parents), as there they can draw on the most extensive information and personal relations.

On the basis of this appraisal, M&D is currently working on a method which, as part of the preparation of Territorial Development Plans⁴⁸, is intended to identify investment opportunities – or mechanisms conducive to them – about which migrants inside and

⁴⁵ PACA, Languedoc-Roussillon and Corse.

⁴⁶ Maghribcom website for Morocco: <http://www.maghribcom.gov.ma/>

⁴⁷ Hassan Benhalima, Mohamed Ben Attou, Mohamed Charef, *Migrations Internationales, Tissu associatif et Développement du Territoire: le cas du 'pays' de Taliouine (Province de Taroudannt)*, Edition ORMES and M&D - September 2011. A study carried out for the 'Migration and Development' workshop at the GFMD held in Taroudannt and Taliouine.

⁴⁸ The preparation of Commune Development Plans has been mandatory for all communes in Morocco since June 2010.

outside the country will be informed. This method will also have to include provisions in host countries for the benefit of migrants wishing to invest in their home country. Thus *pull* factors (identification of investment opportunities) will be combined with *push* factors (identification and support of candidates for investment among migrants within and outside the country) to encourage development of the territory.

This approach illustrates the assumption made at the outset, namely that *the development of the territory* in all its aspects (and not migrants specifically) is the starting point for M&D development strategies.

It should be noted that programmes to support new business formation by migrants in Morocco *do not cover* the development of farming activities, which are nonetheless pursued on a significant scale. This is because these activities that migrants can support or revive *do not lead* to new business start-up in the formal sense⁴⁹.

Indeed, in the rural context, property ownership assumes critical importance in development⁵⁰. M&D tested the difficulties that migrants might experience in their investment projects because of uncertain land ownership rights. They had to invest in a small hotel in their home village. Many of the projects came to nothing because it was impossible to establish the ownership rights needed to achieve this investment⁵¹. From a general standpoint, migrants have often left behind land in their village that has not been farmed in their absence. There has been a clear trend towards the revival of farming on disused land, often on the initiative of migrants who have retired, but also with the return of younger migrants from within or outside the country. When migrants do not take the initiative in this respect, other approaches are possible, and in particular the renting out of land possessed by villagers who have departed (the migrants) to those who have remained in the country. This arrangement runs into difficulties due to a lack of clarity over land ownership rights which are based on testimony rather than on objective written documents. From this angle, migration serves to *reveal* these difficulties when it scatters the community

⁴⁹ In Morocco, the whole agricultural sector is exempt from taxation. While this may encourage farming, it greatly weakens the incentive for new formal business start-up in the sector, especially in the case of small and very small farms, the majority of which are migrant concerns.

⁵⁰ Land tenure security (not to be confused with the land register, which is only one means of securing land ownership rights) seems to be a factor for positive discrimination affecting the emerging countries *vis-à-vis* the low-growth countries, alongside other institutional factors. See Ould Aoudia *et al.*: *Is 'Good Governance' a Good Development Strategy?*, DGTPE Working Papers – No. 2007/11 – November 2007: http://www.cepii.fr/institutions/11_2007_eng.pdf

⁵¹ Supported by the European Union and the AFD in the North and the ADS in Morocco, this programme sought to develop a fair rural tourism sector in the Anti-Atlas, on the basis of investments by migrants in their home village. Lasting from 2003 to 2008, the programme led to the building of 21 rural hostels and the launching of a fair rural tourism sector in the region.

living entirely within the village, in which testimony-based ownership has always made sense, so that testimony becomes unreliable or impossible⁵².

- **All in all, home country public policies** supporting migrant action for development should not, in the majority of cases, target migrants alone. In fact, they can do no more than *reflect* the attitude of the authorities and society as a whole regarding development in general.

The approach concerned with the attractiveness of land areas (which is relevant for all parties involved both within and outside the territory) is apt because the *level of intervention* enables the *active participation of civil society*. The latter includes the migrants who have chosen to commit themselves to their home region and who may act as catalysts within it, either individually or collectively through their migrant association. Coordination with the local authorities, elected representatives and administrative officials is necessary in an ongoing and complex process of negotiation. Here too, migrants may play a key role in bringing about change.

- **The home country local authorities** may play a leading part in recognising migrants as real stakeholders in their territory and genuine protagonists in spite of their physical remoteness.

In Morocco, the new constitutional arrangements grant greater powers to elected representatives in the communes, especially in economic matters. New development plans in particular are to be drawn up at all levels (communes, provinces and regions). M&D has been approached by authorities to support a participatory method of devising these plans, and included migrants in the consultation process. Decentralised cooperation, viewed from the home country angle, may also stimulate the involvement of migrants in their home area, with the difficulties and limits referred to above.

The achievements of the village associations in Morocco in the past 20 years – bearing in mind that villages have no legal identity in the country's territorial subdivisions – in partnership with migrants whom they have included as active agents in village infrastructural projects, are now starting to be implemented by the territorial authorities at a higher level.

- **Development associations:** it is these associations which are responsible for framing the essentials of projects, mainly at village level (in the village associations), or at a broader level (such as that of the commune) with the need to shift the perspective regarding certain matters (such as solid waste processing). But other local players have emerged, including cooperatives and multi-interest forums, which are active in the increasingly complex field of development and within which migrants make a contribution, in spite of their (geographical) distance from events.

⁵² This phenomenon is observed in village cemeteries, in which graves are traditionally marked with two stones at the head and feet respectively of the buried body, with no inscription. As villagers disperse in urban immigration within the country or emigration from it, this practice makes it very hard to identify graves. Names are now gradually being inscribed on them, under pressure from migrants.

- **Finally, at the other end of the chain, are the migrants** who act primarily on behalf of their families still within the country, for themselves (usually in property investment), or for their village, and occasionally at the level of their commune or other authority.

At individual level, migrants have to overcome a relative lack of information and support in their home region, given their absence from it, which hampers their involvement in joint projects or economic investment schemes.

Special mention should be made of *retired migrants* who may return home with proposals for activity, particularly in agriculture. Travelling between the two shores is freer and simpler if they can *transfer* their rights acquired in the host country back to their homeland. For example, they are still not widely recruited as trainers on the basis of the knowledge they have gained in their former professional activity in the host country.

- In working to support rural development in its target region, M&D activates within its geographical coverage this entire transnational chain extending from migrants here to migrants elsewhere. As an organisation itself run by migrants in the region, it can further help to encourage their involvement in local development.

3. Skills transfer, the effects of action by M&D and concluding remarks

3.1. Skills transfer in M&D practice

How can the transfer of knowledge and skills between host and home countries be achieved? Without claiming it is universally applicable, I can endorse the M&D approach, which is related *specifically* to the momentum imparted by the migrants within it.

The insights mentioned here into the method used by M&D to carry out its rural development activity are taken from the conclusions of the Forum it organised within its Taroudannt action area in Morocco in May 2012⁵³. M&D action is based essentially on the *permanent link* forged between traditional values and expertise on the one hand and, on the other, external input comprising mainly the contributions of migrants. Among the traditional values and expertise may be cited *resource management*, along with the sense of *organised joint commitment*. Development is thus viewed in terms of the local resources of values, tradition and knowledge, but in a spirit of openness and appreciation regarding external

⁵³ This M&D Forum took stock of the preceding 12 years (from 2000 to 2012) to identify and discuss likely concerns and goals in the years to come (2012-20). Over 300 persons were convened to appraise M&D activities: they included stakeholders in the territory of the Souss-Massa-Drâa region (leaders of village associations, farming cooperatives and women's associations, etc.), elected local representatives and regional officials, development agency representatives, Moroccan migrant association representatives in France and other European countries (Belgium, Holland, Italy, Switzerland and Spain), representatives of migrant association platforms from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, national authorities and elected representatives, foreign and international institutions and personalities, and national and international experts.

contributions. 'Modernity' is not imposed by disregarding 'tradition', but by joining forces with it.

On the basis of this firm combination, M&D has pursued development activities regarded as a process of *continuous learning*⁵⁴, which inspire a *flow of innovations* that are essentially social but also technical. This process is at any time *legitimised and endorsed* by a *participatory partnership-based* approach. It is participatory because the populations are involved in the decision-making, funding and management of the programmes concerned; and partnership-based because all stakeholders are mobilised, including village leaders, elected local and regional representatives, decentralised administrative authorities, academics and experts. The key feature of this action is the *interlinkage between civil society and central government* in permanent negotiation which is respectful of the rights and duties of each party, and to which migrants may make an important contribution⁵⁵.

3.2. What is the impact?

Overall, this long-term work by M&D has helped to restore confidence to the populations and migrants of the Atlas and Anti-Atlas region – *confidence* in its potential and *confidence* in joint work. The aim is to offer young people in the region prospects other than that of migration, by developing opportunities to 'live and work in the country'⁵⁶. Mobility should be the outcome of a choice, and not of restrictions.

The approach involving *empowerment* of the actors, which is at the very heart of the M&D action method, is productive. Here are some examples:

- After supporting rural electrification of just over 100 villages, on the initiative of the migrants, M&D withdrew from these activities when the national operator (ONE) took over. It is not the task of M&D and the migrants to take the place of public action, but to oblige the state to fulfil its responsibilities.
- As far as the water supply is concerned, villagers and migrants now manage the technical and administrative processes (including research funding). M&D is scaling down its action in this area, but remains operational in the far more complex *sanitation* of small rural units, in which it undertakes what are still experimental activities with villagers.
- As regards the Saffron market, M&D began by mobilising the local and international parties involved in fair trading and inaugurated the annual Saffron festival in 2007, but has now decreased its activity to concentrate on the training of producers and cooperative society

⁵⁴ The expression 'continuous learning' is preferred therefore to that of 'skills transfer', with the former becoming a central feature of development in general. The migrant contribution to such learning may be considerable.

⁵⁵ Natasha Iskander (New York University), Mohamed Charef (Ibn Zohr University Agadir), Hassan Ben Halima (founder of the University of Agadir) and Mohamed Khachani (Mohammed V University, Rabat) have contributed to the comments made here.

⁵⁶ Taken from the conclusions of the Taroudannt Forum, May 2012.

members. It is transferring its action to other local products (olive oil, almonds, aromatic and medicinal plants, cactuses, etc.).

Thus M&D gradually *moves backstage* with the empowerment of local protagonists, raising their level of education and training, developing their instruments of governance, and establishing new links with administrative authorities and markets.

This is consistent with the basic aims of any development initiative.

At a broader level and a time when *pressures and tensions caused by identity issues* are escalating to the North and South of the Mediterranean, the action of M&D shows that reliance on *territorial identity*, and on traditions in both the North and South, may occur on the basis of *openness, dialogue and mutual respect*, and overcome exclusion, the fear of others, and withdrawal.

3.3. Concluding remarks

By considering development from the angle of migration, it is easier to discount the narrowly economic approach to the former, given that the very nature of migration in terms of its dynamics (the movement of people) and its static aspects (the settlement of migrants in their host society) means broadening the array of analytical tools required. Demographics and economics alone cannot get to the bottom of such a complex phenomenon. They have to be supplemented by history, law, anthropology, sociology, political science and geography. All these routes are relevant when considering the issue of development, and it is by *taking all aspects of the development of societies as a starting point* that migration and its possible role in this development may be understood.

• **In this context, how should one address the issue of skills transfer?** Here, a backward glance is required. For over 60 years, the North has showered skills in many different forms on the South: technical volunteers, teachers and lecturers from the North teaching in the South, students in the South who have come to study in the North, executive staff in the South taken in by international organisations, employees in the South in multinationals in the North – by these and other means, the acquisition by the South of expertise from the North has been pursued very intensively. While a share of the human capital concerned has come to operate worldwide by conforming to the western model, the trend has not resulted in significant development, as this standardisation has occurred primarily in the interests of states, big firms in the North and some of the elites in the South. On the other hand, countries that have shaken off underdevelopment and especially those in East Asia, have done so through *self-reliance* on their own resources to expand their skills in accordance with *home-grown aspirations*, as in the striking case of South Korea⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ See the work done by Clotilde Boutrolle in comparing the long-term educational strategies of Korea and Egypt, and demonstrating how in Korea, the priority attached successively to primary education, and then to secondary and higher education has been matched over a 30-year period by increasingly complex phases of economic activity, progressing from textiles to electronics via the intermediate stage of industry and heavy chemicals. *Education and development: a necessary adequacy between educational policies and economic modernization*, Clotilde Boutrolle, Cerefi, Aix-en-Provence, 2009.

This paper challenges the underlying assumption that countries in the South may remain underdeveloped owing to a *lack* of expertise. My belief is that what is at issue in development is the *relation to expertise* rather than *expertise* itself.

‘Underdevelopment’ may indeed be defined as a stable state in society, one of whose main features is that the acquisition of resources is more dependent on closeness to power and on *status*, than on competence and merit⁵⁸. Under these circumstances, consideration of the development issue implies the need to approach the question of competence from the other way round: how can competence and expertise, instead of status and closeness to power, be made the means of accessing the resources of society, in terms of symbols, power and wealth? In this context, migrants may play a role by conveying *a different relation to the expertise* which they may have acquired in their host country, when this is a developed country⁵⁹.

It is the *transfer of cultural models* via new means of communication and particularly satellite channels, rather than the transfer of competence and expertise, that is holding back the development of societies. Migrants are one of the vehicles for such cultural model transfers. In this respect, the media domination acquired by the Gulf countries with their oil-based revenue, gives them immense influence in the Arab world via several hundreds of television channels, which has led to linguistic unification based on Arabic as used in the media, propagation of the social standards and consumption patterns in this region, and extension of its religious precepts, etc. This influence in the Arab world finds itself in competition with the Turkish model, which involves broadcasting numerous programmes translated into Arabic.

- **Refocusing the migration issue on internal social dynamics**

In countries subject to immigration, it is the *intrinsic dynamics* of the society, as regards its economic growth, innovative capacity, and perspectives for its stakeholders, which determine its ability to take in migrants and thus, ultimately, the room for manoeuvre of public policies. ***Migration ‘problems’ cannot be solved in the realm of migration alone.***

The extreme difficulty in devising and implementing migration policies that combine in a balanced fashion the integration of migrants and migrant flow management is due to the *narrowness of approach* in addressing these issues. The polarisation of societies over migrants, which is to some extent fuelled by politicians with references to security and ‘otherness’, is the symptom of their own difficulties.

The same applies to countries experiencing emigration which can only address the issue of the diaspora as it affects *their own development dynamics*: where these are non-existent,

⁵⁸ See for example Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast: *Violence and Social Orders* – Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009.

⁵⁹ The *skills* acquired in the countries of the Gulf are in all respects comparable to those that migrants may acquire in the developed countries. But the *relation to competence and expertise* in these two kinds of host country bears no comparison.

the effects of urging migrants to act on behalf of the development of their home country will be only limited, except at local community or regional level.

• **More specifically, the discourse on development should be based at the outset on *the territory, or specific geographical area in which close relations – and contacts with migrants in particular – are possible between all parties involved***

In countries of emigration and immigration alike, it is therefore important to take development as the starting point, meaning the internal dynamics of societies. But one should also identify *operational levels* at which relations with local interests ('civil society') can materialise, with the formation of *ties based on personal trust*, which rarely occurs at national level except in very small countries. In this way migrants may 'access' development initiatives, through taking part in learning processes, as their involvement is more intense within a circumscribed territory than in the country as a whole.

In the country facing immigration, *decentralised cooperation* may similarly exploit the proximity factor, wherever relations between migrants and their associations on the one hand, and the elected representatives of their local residential communities on the other, can likewise be formed on the basis of contacts involving personal trust.

Devising public policies in host countries calls for discriminating awareness of the migration occurring within them, of its highly complex structural features, and of the relations formed as a result with other actors in society. In home countries, study of the diaspora in all its diversity and of the changes affecting it, as well as the identification of a clear and potentially common vision are also necessary to establish the most effective possible link between the potential of the diaspora and the development mechanisms of the country concerned.

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